Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 7
Issue 1 Symposium: Information and Electronic
Commerce Law: Comparative Perspectives

Article 2

Fall 2001

Database Protection in the Digital Information Age
Charles R. McManis
Washington University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Recommended Citation
McManis, Charles R. (2001) "Database Protection in the Digital Information Age," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 7: Iss. 1,
Article 2.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol7/iss1/2

This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Database Protection in the
Digital Information Age
Charles R. McManis*

It would be an atrocious doctrine to hold that dispatches, the
result of the diligence and expenditure of one man, could with
impunity be pilfered and published by another ....

The mere

fact that a certain class of information is open to all that seek
it, is no answer to a claim to a right of property in such information made by a person who, at his own expense and by his
own labor, has collected it.'
INTRODUCTION

As industries in the global market increasingly come to rely on
electronic compilations of data, 2 calls for new, sui generis forms of
legal protection for databases have grown apace. Yet, as the quotation above illustrates, the issue of data protection is not new-nor
is the world without precedent in determining how the issue of
data protection ought to be resolved.
Indeed, the quotation contains the seeds of two possible approaches to data protection, and therein lies the problem. Should
the law focus more on the data pilferer's wrong or on the data collector's claim to a property right in the data? In other words, is the
* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. B.A., 1964, Birmingham-Southern College; M.A. (Philosophy); J.D., 1972, Duke University. The
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Christopher R. Alder,
J.D., 2001, Washington University in St. Louis, who also provided initial drafts of
portions of this article. The author is likewise indebted to Washington University
law librarians, Hyla Bondareff and Katrina Stierholz, for their research assistance
at several critical points in the preparation of this article. Finally, the author
gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments and suggestions of Justin
Hughes, Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, who graciously read and
commented up an initial draft of this article.
1. Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Telegraph Co., 50 How. Pr. 194, 14 C.O.
Bull. 1493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876).
2. See Robert M. O'Neil, Campus DatabaseIssues, 27 J.C. & U.L. 109 (2000).
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legal solution to the problem of database protection to be found in
the law of unfair competition or the law of intellectual property?
While the United States, which currently dominates the world
database industry,3 remains mired in debate over which approach
to take, the European Union has aggressively opted to create a
new intellectual property right in data. In 1996, after nearly eight
years of discussions over how to improve "a very great imbalance
in the level of investment in the database sector both as between
the Member States and between the Community, and the world's
largest database-producing third countries" 4 (the latter being code
words for the United States), the European Union promulgated its
Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases (EU Database Directive). The Directive not only mandated the harmonization of
European copyright law with respect to the protection of compilations of data, but also obliged its members to create a new, sui
generis form of intellectual property protection for the contents of
the database itself, irrespective of its eligibility for copyright or
other legal protection. Article 7 of the Directive requires Member
States to provide "a right for the maker of a database which shows
that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation
of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the
whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database."5 Coupled with this controversial new intellectual property right, the Database Directive
contains an equally controversial reciprocity provision, which specifies that this right will apply to databases whose makers are nationals or habitual residents of third countries "only if such third
countries offer comparable protection to databases produced by na3. See The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act and The Vessel Hull Design ProtectionAct: Hearingon H.R. 2652 and H.R. 2696 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997) [hereinafter Kirk Statement] (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association) (stating that according to
the Gale Directory of Databases, "the U.S. produces 64.2% of all the world's
databases. Compared to the 6000+ databases produced in the United States, only
nine other countries produce more than 100 databases (Australia, Canada, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and Spain)."), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-kirk.htm.
4. Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996, on the Legal Protection of
Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, recital 11 [hereinafter EU Database Directive].
5. Id. at art. 7.
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tionals of a Member State or persons who have their habitual residence in the territory of the Community." 6 In other words, unless
the United States enacts comparable protection for European
databases, U.S. database producers other than those who also establish themselves in an EU member state will not be entitled to
this sui generis protection.
Not surprisingly, within weeks of the promulgation of the EU
Database Directive, the first U.S. bill aimed at creating a similar
sui generis right in data was proposed in the United States House
of Representatives. 7 Yet today, after five years of pitched debate,
most recently over two bills embodying the two competing approaches to the problem of data piracy, all the United States seems
to have achieved is a legislative stalemate on the issue.
In the now-expired 106th Congress, committees of the United
States House of Representatives considered two bills-H.R. 354
(the "Collections of Information Antipiracy Act")" and H.R. 1858
(the "Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act"). 9 H.R.
354 would effectively create a sui generis right, somewhat analogous to that mandated by the EU Database Directive, by prohibiting the extraction or making available to others of all or a
substantial part of a collection of information gathered, organized
or maintained by another person through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause material harm
to the primary or a related market of that other person or a successor in interest. 10 Though labeled an "antipiracy" act and containing features, such as the "material harm" requirement, suggestive
of a bill designed merely to prevent unfair competition, H.R. 354
nevertheless extends protection to both the primary market of a
database producer and to any related market, and defines a "related market" sufficiently broadly that a database producer would
6. Id. at recital 56.
7. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
8. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999). Actually, there are two versions of this bill,
the original bill as introduced in the House, dated Jan. 19, 1999, and a revised bill
as reported in the House (Union Calendar No. 212), dated Oct. 8, 1999. Unless
otherwise noted, all references in this article will be to the later version of the bill.
9. H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999). There are likewise two versions of this bill,
the original bill as introduced in the House, dated May 19, 1999, and a revised bill
as reported in the House (Union Calendar No. 213), dated Oct. 8, 1999. All references herein are to the later version of the bill.
10. H.R. 354 § 1402.
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be able control a wide range of non-competitive uses of data and
reserve those potential markets for itself.1
By contrast, H.R. 1858 would adopt a much narrower approach to data piracy by prohibiting (1) the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or communication to sell or distribute to the public a database that is a duplicate
of another database and is sold or distributed in competition with
the original database and (2) the misappropriation of real-time
market information. 12 Indeed, H.R. 1858 arguably does little more
than federally codify the common-law tort of "hot news" misappropriation, 13 as it might apply to databases used in interstate and
foreign commerce, and provide the Federal Trade Commission
with enforcement authority. Like the common-law tort of "hot
news" misappropriation, H.R. 1858 responds straightforwardly to
the problem of data piracy by prohibiting the wholesale duplication
of databases for competitive purposes or the misappropriation of
real-time market information, while at the same time ensuring
14
that transformative uses can be made of factual compilations.
By contrast, H.R. 354, like the EU Database Directive, will provide
database producers with substantial control over what transformative uses can be made of databases, thus potentially undermining
competitive conditions in the database industry and discouraging
innovative uses of the very databases whose production it is designed to stimulate. Apparently aware of precisely that possibility,
the EU specified in Article 16(3) of the Database Directive that by
the end of 2001, and every three years thereafter, a report is to be
prepared to verify whether the application of the sui generis right
"has led to abuse of a dominant position or other interference with
free competition which would justify appropriate measures being
taken, including the establishment of non-voluntary licensing
arrangements." 15
11. Id. § 1401(4). For a detailed discussion of the bill's definition of a "related
market," see infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
12. H.R. 1858 §§ 102, 201.
13. For a discussion of the genesis of this common law tort, see infra notes 3440 and accompanying text.

14. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(discussing the importance of being able to make transformative uses of the copyrighted works of others).
15. EU Database Directive, supra note 4, at art. 16(3). It appears that the
EU's concerns were not unfounded. See Commission Decision 01/165/EC of 3 July
2001, Case COMP D3/38.044-NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim measures, 2002
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The emergence of two competing bills in the United States
Congress suggests that the reciprocity provision of the EU
Database Directive is skewing the U.S. debate over database protection, just as it was intended to do. Nor is the United States in
much of a position to protest this use of a reciprocity provision that
foists off a new form of intellectual property protection on an unwilling world, as the United States itself used precisely the same
tactic in 1984 to induce the rest of the world to create sui generis
protection for semiconductor chip designs. 16 Perhaps the best one
can hope for is that the legislative stalemate in Congress might
continue until either the economic consequences of the EU
Database Directive or the legality of its reciprocity provision, or
both, can be determined. However, U.S. congressional leaders are
said to have already decided that a database bill will be introduced
in the current session of Congress, and negotiations with the com17
mittee staffs responsible for H.R. 354 and H.R. 1858 have begun.
The question is what sort of database bill the United States ought
to adopt in light of the challenge posed by the EU Directive.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article will examine how the United
States law of copyrights and unfair competition, as well as the
emerging law of electronic contracts, currently protects compilaO.J. (L 59) 18 (granting interim measures requiring sales data company to license
its copyrighted database structure to its competitors based on a finding of abuse of
its dominant position). However, this decision was later suspended by the President of the Court of First Instance pending further examination upon appeal; see
Order T-184/01 R 2 (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://curia.eu.intjurisp/cgi-bin/
form.pl?lang=en; see also EC Competition Policy Newsletter, Feb., 2002, at 61,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2002-l.
pdf.
16. See Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPS on the Information Superhighway: InternationalIntellectual PropertyProtectionand Emerging Computer Technology, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 207, 258-59 (1996) [hereinafter McManis, Taking TRIPS];
Charles R. McManis, InternationalProtections for Semiconductor Chip Designs
and the Standardof JudicialReview of PresidentialProclamationsIssued Pursuant to the Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct of 1984, 22 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. &
Econ. 331, 338-39 (1988).
17. See Robert MacMillan, House Committees Try To Thaw Database Bill
Freeze, Newsbytes (Mar. 29, 2001) (reporting the reopening of discussions to try to
fashion a common database intellectual property bill out of the two conflicting
bills), at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/163826.html; Washington Affairs Office, Am. Ass'n of Law Libraries, House Legislation to Protect Databases (July
2001) (reporting on eight weekly meetings, co-hosted by House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner and House Energy & Commerce Committee
Chairman Billy Tauzin, between proponents and opponents of database legislation), available at http//www.1l.Georgetown.edulaallwash/ib0720012.html.
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tions of data, and what additional legislative protection is being
proposed. Part II will examine how the changing face of the
database industry in the new digital age has enhanced both the
value and the vulnerability of investments in electronic compilations of data, thus precipitating the current spate of legislative proposals for sui generis database protection. Part III will examine
the particular conditions and motivations that led to the promulgation of the EU Database Directive, and describe the sui generis protection mandated therein. Finally, Part IV will compare the two
most recent United States legislative proposals, both with each
other and with the EU Database Directive, concluding with some
thoughts about what the United States government should do in
light of the dilemma it faces in responding to the challenge posed
by the EU Database Directive.
I.

PROTECTION OF COMPILATIONS OF DATA: CURRENT U.S. LAW
AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION

In the United States, calls for sui generis database protection
began to mount in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's
1991 ruling in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 18 which held that white pages of a telephone directory were
not sufficiently original and creative to warrant copyright protection. 19 In Feist, the Court reiterated its long-standing insistence
"that the fact/expression dichotomy limits severely the scope of
[copyright] protection in fact-based works."20 Specifically, it held
that:
Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original selection
or arrangement of facts, but the copyright
is limited to the
21
particular selection or arrangement.
In so holding, the Court repudiated a line of lower court cases that
held that compilations of data were copyrightable per se, merely
because they were the product of the "sweat of the brow" of their
22
producers.
18.

499 U.S. 340 (1991).

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 352-61.
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For almost a century, U.S. copyright protection had seemed to
derive from two not altogether consistent theoretical models. On
the one hand, the courts insisted that the sine qua non of copyright
protection was the requirement of "originality," which was defined
to mean not only that the work was an independent creation of the
author (as opposed to being copied from other works), but also that
it possessed at least some minimal degree of creativity. 2 3 On the
other hand, a competing line of lower court decisions involving
compilations of data also embraced the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" concept, which viewed copyright protection as
24
a reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts.
The "sweat of the brow" doctrine, however, was seriously undermined by the Copyright Act of 197625 and then definitively put
to rest by the Supreme Court in Feist. Section 103 of the 1976 Copyright Act explicitly included compilations within the subject matter of copyright, but section 101 defined a "compilation" as a 'Work
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or
of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship."2 6 Notwithstanding this language, some lower courts
continued to reward "sweat of the brow" by extending copyright
protection to mere facts, 2 7 thus stimulating the Supreme Court to
reiterate in Feist that compilations are copyrightable only if and to
28
the extent that their selection or arrangement of data is original.
As if to preempt any subsequent legislative modification of its
holding, the Court emphasized that "originality" of expression is
not merely statutory but a constitutional requirement for United
29
States copyright protection.

23. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Burrow-Giles Lithograph
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
24. See, e.g., Jeweler's Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83
(2d Cir. 1922); Leon v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
25. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1994).
26. Id. § 101.
27. See, e.g., West Publ'g. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that Mead Data Central's proposal to introduce "star pagination"
showing West's page numbers in its own LEXIS database service would constitute
copyright infringement).
28. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
29. Id. at 358-62.
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The Feist decision has not only brought the lower courts in the
United States to heel, 30 but also seems to have gained a measure of
international recognition,3 1 and the statutory language on which it
was based subsequently found its way into the text of the GATT/
WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, commonly known as the TRIPS Agreement.3 2 Article 10(2)
of TRIPS states that "compilations of data or other material,
whether in machine readable or other form, which by reason of the
selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual
creations shall be protected as such."3 3 Far from quieting the debate over the protection of databases, however, the Feist decision
and Article 10 of TRIPS have merely served to transform the terms
of the debate, both in the United States and elsewhere.
Frustrated with the Feist decision and the limited application
of copyright laws to factual compilations, some United States
database owners have looked to state misappropriation law to protect their investments. Ironically, the common-law concept of "hot
news" misappropriation traces its roots to another seminal United
States Supreme Court case, InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,34 decided some seventy years prior to Feist. The International News case is a relic from an earlier era in which federal
courts created their own "federal common law" for application in
diversity of citizenship cases. The Court's reasoning in International News is reminiscent of the colorful New York Supreme
Court quotation appearing at the outset of this article, denouncing
the "atrocious doctrine ... [that would] hold that dispatches, the
30. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g. Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding pagination not copyrightable); Warren Publ'g., Inc. v. Microdos Data
Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 936 (1997) (holding
that a comprehensive compilation of cable system providers was not sufficiently
original and was not protected against wholesale copying).
31. See, e.g., Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info., Inc., 76 C.P.R.
(3d) 296, 1997 CPR Lexis 1276 (Fed. Ct. of App., Quebec, 1997) (citing Feist and
other U.S. lower court decisions as "useful guides" in a case holding a compilation
of information contained in Yellow Pages directories to be uncopyrightable under
Canadian law).
32. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
33. Id. at art. 10(2).
34. 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see also Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.,
198 U.S. 236 (1905).
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result of the diligence and expenditure of one man, could with impunity be pilfered and published by another." 35 In International
News, the Court held that a news service had a "quasi-property"
interest in the news that it had gone to the expense of collecting, 3 6
and could thus prevent, on a theory of unfair competition, a rival
news service from appropriating that news for a competitive pur37
pose even after the news had become public.
Although InternationalNews, as a part of the federal common
law, was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court's later decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,38 which held that federal
courts are to apply state common law in diversity cases, 3 9 its underlying principles have survived in state case law, and indeed,
have been applied even in the absence of any competition between
the parties, thus coming perilously close to creating de facto (or
quasi-) property rights in data.4 ° In Feist itself, the United States
Supreme Court quoted with seeming approval a respected commentator's observation that protection of facts and ideas "may in
certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair competition."4 1 More recently, in NationalBasketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.,4 2 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that although sports scores were mere facts, thus lacking sufficient
originality to qualify for federal copyright protection, they might
nevertheless be protected against misappropriation as "hot news"
35. Kiernan, 50 How. Pr. at 194.
36. Int'l News, 248 U.S. at 236. It is important to note, however, that the
Court's characterization of the news as "quasi property" was primarily designed to
sustain the Court's equity jurisdiction over the controversy, as a court of equity
generally "concerns itself only in the protection of property rights," but "treats any
civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right." Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id.

38. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
39. Id. at 78-80. Pockets of federal common law may nevertheless remain, yet
are "few and restricted." See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citing
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963))).
40. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.
2d 84 (Ill. 1983) (holding that offering a commodity futures contract based on the
Dow Jones Industrial Average without the consent of Dow Jones & Co. would misappropriate a valuable business asset of Dow Jones & Co., even though the latter
did not deal in commodity futures contracts and had no plans to do so).
41. Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 (quoting Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 3.04, at 3-23 (footnote omitted)).
42. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
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despite their lack of originality. 43 Significantly, however, the court
went on to hold that "hot news" misappropriation claims would
survive the federal preemption provisions of U.S. copyright law
only when the plaintiff and the defendant are in direct competition
and the appropriation, if not prohibited, would threaten the very
existence of the product or service provided by the plaintiff.4 4 Because this had not been shown, the court ordered the NBA's claim
45
for misappropriation dismissed.
Database owners have also sought to avail themselves of various forms of federal and state legislative protection. For example,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 4 6 protects electronic
communications from interception and provides civil remedies and
criminal penalties for violations of the Act. 4 7 The Act also prohibits intentionally accessing without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided and thereby
obtaining access to an electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such a system.48 Database developers have also
sought protection under the Lanham Act. Claims for false designation of origin under section 43(a), passing off, and trademark dilution under section 43(c) are potential causes of action for database
developers against pirates. 4 9 When the source and reliability of
data is significant to the intended users, these Lanham Act claims
may prove efficacious.
With the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) of 1999,50 yet another form of protection became available
to database producers. The DMCA implements the World Intellec43. Id. at 852-53; but see Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d
772, 786-89 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding federal preemption).
44. Nat'l BasketballAss'n, 105 F.3d at 853.
45. Id. at 853-54.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-11 (1994).
47. An "electronic communication" is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or
in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system
that affects interstate or foreign commerce .

.

.

."

18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

48. Id. § 2701(a). An "electronic communications service" is defined as 'any
service which provides to the users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications," id. § 2510(15), while the term "electronic storage" is
defined as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transfer thereof .... " Id. § 2510(17).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1998).
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tual Property Organization Copyright Treaty 51 by prohibiting circumvention of copyright protection systems and protecting the
integrity of copyright management information systems, including
terms and conditions for use of a work. 5 2 The anti-circumvention
provision of the DMCA prohibits (1) the circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to or a work protected under U.S. copyright law and (2) the manufacture of,
importation of, offering to the public of, providing of, or trafficking
in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part
thereof, that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing either anti-access or anti-copying technological
measures. 53 The copyright management information provision
prohibits the unauthorized removal or alteration of copyright management information or providing, distributing, or importing for
distribution, false copyright management information, which is54defined to include any terms and conditions for use of the work.
The DMCA explicitly limits its prohibitions to circumvention
of technological measures that effectively control access to or copying of "a work protected under this title" [i.e., Title 17 of the U.S.
Code], and removal or alteration of "copyright" management infor55
mation without the authority of the copyright owner. Thus, the
DMCA would not seem to protect uncopyrightable databases.
However, a party engaging in either circumvention of technological
protection measures or deletion or alteration of management information associated with an ostensibly uncopyrightable compilation
of data apparently bears the risk that the database will turn out to
contain copyrightable subject matter, thereby subjecting the party
to liability under the DMCA. Thus, the DMCA appears to provide
inadvertent legal protection for self-help technological and contractual measures designed to deter data piracy.
In addition to and complementing the DMCA, another potent
legislative source of protection for databases can be found in the
recently promulgated Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which is explicitly designed to make enforcea51. The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12,
1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997).
52. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (Supp. IV 1998).
53. Id. § 1201.
54. Id. § 1202.
55. Id. §§ 1201, 1202.
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ble so-called "shrinkwrap" and "click-wrap" licenses. 56 UCITA has
now been adopted in two states 5 7 thus creating the prospect that
database contents can be effectively protected by a combination of
technological protection measures and "click-wrap" contracts-in
short, a kind of "electronic trade secret" protection.
Even before UCITA was promulgated, the potency of this form
of database protection had been illustrated in cases such as ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg,58 the facts of which are strongly reminiscent of
Feist. In ProCD,the plaintiff compiled more than 3,000 telephone
directories into a computer database and sold a version of the
database on CD-ROMs, accompanied by a shrinkwrap license encoded on the CD-ROMs, as well as printed in an instruction manual, which limited the use of the database to non-commercial
purposes. 59 The defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, bought a copy of
the CD-ROM but decided to ignore the license and began reselling
the information on the Internet to anyone willing to pay a price
that was less than what ProCD charged its commercial customers
for the database. 60 ProCD filed suit, seeking an injunction against
any further dissemination that exceeded the rights specified in the
license.6 1 The district court refused to grant relief, holding that
the licenses were ineffectual because their terms did not appear on
the outside of the CD-ROM packages, and that even if the license
terms were enforceable contracts, they were preempted under section 301(a) of the United States Copyright Act.6 2 In an opinion by
Judge Frank Easterbrook, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
56. Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edubll/ulc/ucita/ucitsFinalOO.htm; see also, Amelia H. Boss,
Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 7 Roger Williams
Univ. L. Rev. 167, 168 n.1 (2001).
57. See Md. Code Ann., Com. Law II § 22 (Supp. 2001); Va. Code Ann. § 59.143 (Michie 2001). For detailed information about the ongoing debate over the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, see www.ucitaonline.com.
58. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); but see Step-Saver Data Sys.,
Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201
(D. Kan. 1998).
59. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-50.
60. Id. at 1450.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1450, 1453.
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Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the contracts
were enforceable under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and not preempted by federal copyright law.63 Though the case is
controversial, it nevertheless underscores the potency of existing
legal protections for databases under U.S. law.
Meanwhile, the European Union, recognizing its shrinking
market share in the global information industry, promulgated its
landmark 1996 Database Directive requiring member countries to
implement sui generis protection that accords a broad, transferable
right to prevent the extraction and/or utilization of the whole, or a
substantial part (evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively), of
the contents of a database, whether or not copyrightable. 6 4 The
Directive makes it equally clear that the maker of a database may
not prevent a lawful user from extracting and/or re-utilizing insubstantial parts of the database, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, for any purpose whatsoever, and that any contractual
provision to the contrary shall be null and void.6 5 Member states
may (but are not required to) create exceptions, allowing lawful
users of a database made available to the public to extract or reutilize a substantial part of its contents for three limited purposes.66 The term of protection is fifteen years from the first day of
the next calendar year following completion of the database, or if it
is made available to the public, fifteen years from the first day of
the next calendar year following publication. 6 7 Any substantial
change in the contents of the database that would result in the
database being considered a substantially new investment would
be entitled to its own term of protection. 68 Finally, in stating that
63. Id. at 1452-55. For a critique of the ProCD decision, see Charles R.
McManis, The Privatization(or "Shrink-wrapping")of American Copyright Law,

87 Cal. L. Rev. 173, 178-79, 182-84 (1999).
64. EU Database Directive, supra note 4, at art. 7.
65. Id. at art. 8.
66. Id. at art. 9. Lawful users of a database made available to the public may
extract or re-utilize as substantial part of its contents: (a) in the case of extraction
for private purposes of the contents of a non-electronic database; (b) in the case of
extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as
long as the source is indicated and to the extent justified by the non-commercial
purpose to be achieved; and (c) in the case of extraction and/or re-utilization for the
purposes of public security or an administrative or judicial purpose. Id.
67. Id. at art. 10.
68. Id.
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protection will be accorded to databases whose makers are not nationals, habitual residents, or legal persons established in a member state only if the country of origin of the database offers
"comparable protection" to databases produced by nationals, habitual residents or legal persons established in a member country of
the European Community, the Directive seems to place those segments of the U.S. database industry that do not have an established presence in the EU at a potentially serious competitive
disadvantage in the EU. 69
Not surprisingly, promulgation of the EU Database Directive
immediately generated demands for sui generis database protection in the United States and stimulated a series of proposed legislative responses. Thus far, however, the only result has been a
legislative stalemate. As we have seen, the two bills most recently
considered by the United States Congress-H.R. 354 and H.R.
1858-reflect two competing approaches to sui generis database
protection. H.R. 354 would accord a database developer a limitedterm right,7 0 somewhat analogous to that created by the EU
Database Directive, to prevent non-competing as well as competing
uses of substantial portions of a database, thus recreating a limited form of the "sweat of the brow" protection laid to rest in
Feist.7 1 By contrast, H.R. 1858 would provide a narrower form of
misappropriation protection by prohibiting only (1) the sale or distribution to the public of a competing duplicate of a database collected and organized by another and (2) misappropriation of realtime market information, thus effectively "re-federalizing" the
holding in InternationalNews, at least as applied to databases.
Other countries are closely following the debate in the United
States over database protection. Japan may have opted in favor of
an unfair competition approach to database protection when it
amended its Unfair Competition Law in 1993 to prohibit, for a limited three-year term of protection, the slavish imitation (referred to

69.

See id. at art 11(3) and recital 56; but see infra note 184 and accompanying

text.
70. H.R. 354 § 1409(c), 106th Cong. (1999). For a detailed discussion of the
interesting way H.R. 354 manages to create a limited term of protection and yet
maintain its credentials as an antipiracy act, see infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
71. H.R 354, § 1409(d).
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in Japanese as "dead copies") of another's goods. 7 2 While the subject of slavish copying under Japan's Unfair Competition Law can
only be products, not services, computer software and databases
apparently qualify as products when marketed on floppy discs or
CDs, and the law may even extend to virtual goods. 7 3 Australia is
said to be "walking a fine line between, on the one hand, supporting improvement of copyright protection against new uses in the
digital environment and, on the other, avoiding excessive copyright
protection resulting in denial of reasonable access to works and/or
increased adverse balance of trade in copyright royalties." 7 4 Korea
is also considering how databases ought to be protected. 75 Accordingly, the choice of one U.S. bill over the other will be extremely
influential in determining the fate of database protection on the
global scale.
II.

A.

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE DATABASE INDUSTRY

Databases and Digital Technology

Digital technology is radically changing the face of the
database industry. The number of files in electronic databases has
increased from four billion in 1991 to eleven billion in 1997, a staggering 200+% increase. 7 6 The number of searches of such information grew comparably, roughly doubling during any five-year
period during the past decade. 77 Likewise, the source of database
development has dramatically shifted. In the late 1970s, 78% of all
databases were produced by government, academic and other nonprofit providers, while the commercial sector accounted for the re78
maining 22%. By 1997, the percentages were exactly reversed.
72. See Unfair Competition Act [Japan], Law No. 47/1993, § 2(3) (May 19,
1993); see generally Christopher Heath, The System of Unfair Competition Prevention in Japan 120-40 (2001) (discussing Japan's approach to combating unfair
competition).
73. See Heath, supra note 72, at 130-31.
74. Matilda in Cyberspace, Berne Protocol-Latest Development (July 9, 1996)
(e-mail from Jaime Wodetski, commenting on database protection proposals prepared for the benefit of the Libraries Copyright Committee), at httpf/

www.anu.edu.au/Matilda/issues/199607/715.source.html

(last visited Apr. 11,

2001).
75. See Sang Jo Jong & Junu Park, Property Versus Misappropriation:Legal
Protectionfor Databasesin Korea, 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y (forthcoming) (2002).
76. O'Neal, supra note 2, at 109.
77. Id.

78. Id.
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While the database industry has long been producing
databases in the absence of sui generis protection, the digital
revolution has both enhanced the utility of databases and exposed
the vulnerability of investments in their production. Although
printed databases, such as telephone directories and retail catalogs, remain important in certain industries, digitized multimedia
databases have far more utility than printed compilations. Because electronic databases can be navigated more efficiently than
printed publications, they are of growing importance to the
database industry and have made the creation of exhaustive factual compilations practical.7 9 Internet search engines allow users
to engage in their own selection and arrangement of the contents of
mega-databases into smaller, individually tailored databases.
The limitation of copyright to the original selection and arrangement of a database was developed with printed databases in
mind. The selection and arrangement of data in a printed
database creates value to the user because a random collection of
facts would be of little or no use.8 0 Today, database software performs the tedious task of coordination and arrangement. Internet
databases are generally arranged to maximize storage capacity
and only become arranged for human use upon a user's individual
request.
Free riding in the database industry has been facilitated by
the exponential increase in the speed at which data can be transmitted. In 1991, the year Feist was decided, it would have taken
the average modem, working 24 hours a day, 154 days to copy an
average sized database. 8 ' With current modems and the advent of
82
DSL, the same database can be copied in 1.7 minutes.
Electronic databases on the Internet afford many advantages,
such as access and ease of subsequent modifications; however, accessibility also facilitates data piracy. A closed network would allow for a higher level of security and easier detection of
unauthorized uses, but is more difficult and time-consuming and
79. See Kirk Statement, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that of the approximately
11,000 databases listed in the Gale Directory of Databases, almost all are in electronic form-5,950 are made available online, 3,000 are on CD-ROM, 1,000 on diskette, and 700 on magnetic tape).
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.

20011

DATABASE PROTECTION

may tend to discourage use.8 3 As internet applications become
more widespread, consumers expect access to data over the web.
Moreover, the mere ability to protect a database with anti-copying technology does not necessarily obviate the need for legal protection. The fact that a landowner can erect a fence around his
property does not mean he should forfeit a cause of action for trespassing. The question currently before U.S. legislators is what
kind of fences should be created and what kind of trespass claims
should be allowed.
B.

Reasons ForProviding Sui Generis Protection of Databases

There are several reasons for providing sui generis protection
for databases. First, the collection and organization of data require a large up-front investment. Second, the accessibility of information in the digital information age has made the wholesale
copying of large compilations a simple task. Third, there is considerable concern among U.S. companies that the lack of protection in
Europe, in the absence of reciprocal protection in the United
States, will put them at a distinct competitive disadvantage.
The compilation of a database requires a substantial investment. Producers of printed databases at one time enjoyed natural
"lead-time" with which to exploit their product, as copying a large
printed compilation was time consuming. Today, the wholesale
copying of an electronic database can be completed in seconds with
100% accuracy. The concept of providing artificial "lead-time" to
minimize harm to a database developer's market is reflected in the
state common law "hot news" misappropriation doctrine.8 4 Providing a limited term of such artificial leadtime allows database developers to recoup their investment of research and development
costs.8 5 If free riders can immediately and perfectly copy the
database, the original developer will be deprived of the opportunity
to develop its market niche.
Because under current copyright law databases are protected
only if and to the extent that they contain material selected or arranged in an organized manner, massive databases intended to be
83. Id.
84. For a discussion of the origins of this doctrine, see supra notes 34-40 and
accompanying text.
85. See generally J. H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51, 145-46 (1997).
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comprehensive may fall short of the minimum level of originality
required by Feist. Moreover, computer searchable databases are
not organized in any humanly understandable manner until there
is a request from a specific user. Even if the organization of a comprehensive database does present a modicum of creativity, the resulting "thin" copyright protection may be abrogated by the merger
doctrine.8 6 Those works surviving the merger doctrine will be subject to a fair use privilege that is generally thought to be far
broader when factual compilations, rather than highly creative
87
works, are involved.
Economists argue that databases present a significant potential for a free rider problem.8 8 For example, the American Medical
Association (AMA) licenses many of its databases internationally.8 9 If the EU reciprocity provision is enforced in the absence of
U.S. legislation, the AMA fears it may have little recourse for the
widespread appropriation of its efforts in Europe. 90 "Adopting
database protection legislation in the United States could be a step
toward providing the necessary 'reciprocity' in order to protect U.S.
databases in the EU."9 1
C.

The Dangersof Too Much Protection

As compelling as these reasons may be for providing some sort
of sui generis protection for databases, there are equal dangers in
providing too much protection. Recognizing the market effects of
intellectual property legislation is essential to the maintenance of
86. See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967) (stating that when there is only a limited number of ways to express an idea,
courts will find that the idea has merged with the expression and thus not copyrightable). Highly factual or functional expression, such as recipes, parts lists,
identification numbers, and the like, even if capable of being expressed in more
than one way, are particularly vulnerable to application of the merger doctrine.
87. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
88. See, e.g., Collections of InformationAntipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 2652
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearing26521 (statement of Robert E.
Aber, on behalf of The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc.), available at httpJ/
www.house.gov/judiciary/41143.htm.
89. Id. (statement of Richard F. Corlin, M.D., on behalf of the AMA), available
at http://www.house.govjudiciary/41145.htm.
90. For a less alarmist view of the availability of protection for U.S. databases
in Europe, see infra note 184 and accompanying text.
91. See Hearing2652, supra note 88 (statement of Richard F. Corlin, M.D., on
behalf of the AMA), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41145.htm.
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a sound industrial policy. The combination of sui generis database
protection, copyright law, unfair competition law, contract law and
encryption measures may overprotect databases and thus allow
database developers to dominate markets and extract monopoly
profits.
Opponents of sui generis protection for databases may well argue that no further economic incentive is needed in the United
States, as its database industry is not only thriving, but dominating the global market place under current U.S. law. Because copyright protection requires only a modicum of creativity in selection
and arrangement, databases could probably be organized sufficiently to qualify for at least "thin" copyright protection-though
not for protection against wholesale duplication of the data itself.
As we have seen, database developers can also rely on the contractual self-help measures of the sort authorized by UCITA, which
validates and enforces click-through agreements. 9 2 Also available
to database developers are the technological self-help measures
protected by the DMCA, which prohibits both the circumvention of
technological protection for copyrighted works and the deletion or
alteration of any copyright management information, including
conditions for use of the work.9 3
The scientific research community claims that sui generis
database legislation of the sort mandated by the EU Database Directive and embodied in legislative predecessors of H.R. 354 will
increase costs for future research projects. 94 Scientific researchers
claim that implementation of such legislation will make it more
difficult and costly to access data concerning a wide range of topics
such as weather statistics and human genome data. 95 Some data
is so expensive that with sui generis database protection in effect,
96
it would be cost-prohibitive to gather a large collection of facts.
One particularly striking example of the harm that can result from
a grant of property rights in data can be found in the privatization
92. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
94. See Andrew Lawler, DatabaseAccess Fight Heats Up, Science, Nov. 15,
1996, at 1074.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Anne Linn, History of Database Protection:Legal Issues of Concern to the Scientific Community (Mar. 3, 2000) ("a single synthetic aperture radar
scene costs $1600."), at http://www.codata.org/codata/data_access/linn.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2001).
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of data from the Landsat series of remote sensing satellites.9 7 Following privatization, the prices of Landsat data increased from approximately $400 to $4,400 per image, effectively putting them out
of reach of most academics and independent researchers.9 ,
More importantly, as one congressional witness noted: "To a
great degree, the value of technology is cumulative. We cannot
make progress without building freely on the data and results of
the past."99 Likewise, in testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, a spokesman for several large scientific organizations stated that:
Data are the building blocks of knowledge and the seeds of
discovery. They challenge us to develop new concepts, theories, and models to make sense of the patterns we see in
them. They provide the quantitative basis for testing and
confirming theories and for translating new discoveries into
useful applications for the benefit of society. They also are
the foundation of sensible public policy in our democracy.
The assembled record of scientific data and resulting information is both a history of events in the natural world and a
record of human accomplishment.10 0
When assessing the value of sui generis legislation and deciding to
what degree exclusionary rights should be granted, lawmakers
must balance the social benefits of databases that would not be
available in the absence of protection against the loss of innovative
and transformative uses of databases that might not occur because
of the existence of database protection. The scientific community
and research and development industries frequently conduct research by applying novel theories of analysis to existing data in
order to highlight certain trends. By reviewing larger databases
and carefully organizing selected data, a researcher may discover
97. See Michael J. Bastian, Protectionof "Noncreative"Databases:Harmonization of UnitedStates, Foreignand InternationalLaw, 22 B.C. Intl & Comp. L. Rev.
425, 431 (1999).
98. Id. at 431-32.
99. Hearing 2652, supra note 88 (statement of Tim D. Casey on behalf of the
Information Technology Association of America), available at http/www.house.
gov/judiciary/41149.htm.
100. Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 354 before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Joshua Lederberg, Nobel laureate, on behalf of
NAS, NAE, IOM and the American Association for the Advancement of Science),
available at http:/www.house.gov/judiciary/106-lede.htm.
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trends lost in the larger context of the original database. By further refining the original data, secondary databases thus add value
to the original. 10 1
Some sectors of the information technology industry itself are
also disturbed by the prospect of sui generis protection for
databases. They claim that the imposition of increased business
costs will drive the entire information technology industry offshore
and heighten the dangers of incipient monopoly. 10 2 As one congressional witness noted: "Tom [Feist] was left with no choice but
to copy listings in order to provide consumers a convenient, onebook directory covering eleven different service areas, because one
of the telcos refused to license its listings to him."10 3 Internet
based companies argue that database protection will result in industry concentration, and will increase the cost and diminish the
utility of search engines, as web browsers will either have to main10 4
tain their own databases or license them from competitors.
Technologically oriented companies also predict rising costs associated with world wide web industries due to monopoly pricing.' 0 5
Concern has also been expressed that "granting protection for interface specifications could threaten competition on the Internet"
by concentrating a highly competitive industry into a nucleus of
dominant firms.' 0 6
Overly broad database protection could thus inhibit the production of transformative databases by raising barriers to entry
101, National Research Council, Preserving Scientific Data on Our Physical
Universe 16 (1995):
In all areas of research, the collection of data sets is not an end in itself,
but rather a means to an end, the first step in the creation of new information, knowledge, and understanding. As part of that process, the original
databases are continually refined and recombined to create new
databases and new insights. Typically, each level of processing adds value
to an original (raw) data set by summarizing the original product, synthesizing a new product, or providing an interpretation of the original data.
Id.
102. Hearing 2652, supra note 88 (statement of Tim D. Casey on behalf of the
Information Technology Association Of America), available at http://www.house.
gov/judiciary/41149.htm.
103. Id. (statement of William Hammack on behalf of the Association of Directory Publishers), available at http/Avww.house.gov/judiciary/4116.htm.
104. See generally id. (discussing the impact of concentrated ownership) (statement of Jonathan Band on behalf of the Online Banking Association), availableat
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41148.htm.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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and costs associated with gathering, verifying and maintaining
compilations.' 0 7 While observations and facts have little inherent
value, the collection and processing of such facts to discern trends
adds economic value to the bare facts. Unprocessed facts are the
most difficult to understand and frequently of little use to anyone
other than an expert researcher.10 8 "With every successive level of
processing, the data tend to become more understandable and frequently are better documented for the lay user."10 9 As a matter of
sound public policy, scientists should be encouraged to analyze and
refine, rather than simply collect, data; protection should only be
accorded to compilations that add value to the underlying facts by
providing a new or creative organization. Regard for the value of
transformative uses of databases reveals an overlap with copyright
protection. As raw facts are selected, refined and arranged, their
expression is more likely to benefit from copyright protection.
Because sui generis protection will create an economic barrier
to the access of information, not only companies but also developing countries would inevitably face higher barriers to entry. The
worldwide implementation of protective legislation for databases
could have profound economic consequences for developing countries. Because the right to exclude is inherent in intellectual property rights, "enhancing the value of the intellectual property assets
of one company-or country-will necessarily lead to increased intellectual property liability of other companies or countries." 10
D.

Term of Protection

A further problem posed by sui generis proposals for database
protection is defining the term of protection. There are three possible schemes for defining the term of protection for a database. The
first provides static protection for a term beginning at the completion of the original edition of the database. The second provides
dynamic protection for the most recent edition of the database in
107. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
108. See J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads:Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science on Technology, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 793 (1999).
109. Id. at 813.
110. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Propertyand InternationalMergers and
Acquisitions, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1289 (1998).
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its entirety. The third provides variable protection for the original
database and subsequent additions for staggered fixed terms.
The static model protects an initial investment, but does not
provide incentives for the developer to update the compilation.
The static model has an inherent bias in favor of historic data, as
updates to databases would not be protected. Dynamic protection
encourages further revision and development of a database by
granting a new term of protection for each new edition of the work.
A major concern regarding dynamic protection for electronic
databases is that the term may effectively be perpetual for frequently updated databases, unless some method of distinguishing
between new and old material is specified. 1 " The variable model
provides a fixed term of protection to the original work and protects new entries in future editions for a similar term, resulting in
staggered terms of protection for different entries in the same
database. Protecting only those modifications that were made after the initial term expires may be impractical. Either the
database developer would have to provide notice, which would create unnecessary bulk and complexity within the database, or the
user would incur the burden of identifying which entries were protected and which were not.
The very difficulty in developing a workable option regarding
the term of a property right in data suggests that a liability scheme
may be preferable.
III.

THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE

A. Impetus for the EU Directive
The dilemma for Europe is that the United States currently
dominates the world database industry. 1 12 While in 1990 European database developers produced almost half the world total of
databases, they accounted for only one-quarter of the total revenue." 3 The explanation for the discrepancy is that non-profit pro111. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
112. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The Times of Our Lives, U.S. News & World
Rep., Dec. 27, 1999, at 68 (stating that of the "48 information technology companies that Morgan Stanley Dean Witter believes will enjoy a competitive advantage
over the next number of years, 31 are American. Only six are European.").
113. See Charles von Simson, Note, Feist or Famine-AmericanDatabaseCopyright as an Economic Model for the European Union, 20 Brook. J. Int'l L. 729, 731
(1995).
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ducers (i.e., governments) produced the majority (54%) of
European databases, whereas the private sector produced the majority of databases in the United States. 114 With one exception,
Europe is nearly completely dependent on foreign commercial
databases. 1 15 The exception is Reuters, a U.K. corporation, which
116
is the world's largest supplier of real-time financial information.
Given this state of affairs, it is initially surprising that the EU
would be the first to implement highly protectionist database legislation. There are however basically two underlying reasons-one
technological and one linguistic.
1.

Development of Computer Related Technology

As the market for printed databases deteriorates, the integration of modern computing technologies becomes increasingly important. 1 7 The European Union sought legislative protection for
databases in an effort to reverse a growing trade deficit in the electronic data market. The promulgation of the Database Directive
came on the heels of a 1994 study of electronic information services, which stated that, "with the exceptions of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands all EEA countries had negative trade
balances."' 1 8
The digital revolution originated in the United States rather
than in Europe, and the European Union is thus getting a late
start. The Internet was created by the United States government
and quickly fostered "a thriving Internet core economy, creating
new businesses, new revenue streams, and, more importantly, new
jobs."" 9 As of 1997, the United States was acknowledged to have
114. Id.
115. See Information Market Observatory, European Information Trends, § 1,
at http://158.169.50.95:10080/imo/entrend96/trend96-toc.html (last visited Dec.
11, 2001). Iceland imports 93.3% of data, Austria imports 86.2%, and Luxembourg
imports 88.0%. Id.
116. Id. § 3.5.
117. Of 147 European directory publishers, only 27 earned gross revenues of 50
million ECU per year. These publishers are also responsible for many retail catalogs. As corporate catalogs are indicative of future retail performances, the potential loss of catalog publication companies within the EU may make it easier for
foreign firms to develop a significant market share. Id.
118. Id. § 2.2.
119. A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at para. 17, available at http://www.cordis.lu/src/ecomcoml.
htm (last updated Apr. 16, 1997).
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built a substantial lead over Europe. 120 The EU also acknowledged that a similar lead seemed to be opening up in the strategic
sector of electronic commerce tools, products and technologies that
12 1
underpin the future development of electronic commerce.
2. Linguistic Fragmentation
Linguistic fragmentation may be another reason that the European market share of the database industry is eroding. The EU
operates in eleven different languages; every document produced
by EU government authorities is translated into each language
before publication. 12 2 The large number of languages complicates
competitive markets by eliminating economies of scale in the production of language-based databases. As English is the preferred
language of many business transactions, the demand is higher for
English-based databases.
Between 1992 and 1998 the percentage of sites based on English rose from 67% to 70%.123 The worldwide number of internet
sites based on the English language is currently 65.1%.124 As
databases are frequently based in part on prior data compilations,
the entrenchment of English language databases should continue.
Additionally, the two largest encyclopedia services, Microsoft's Encarta and the British Encyclopedia Britannica, are English-based
works.
Nearly half of the current 250 million Americans rely on internet based data. 12 5 That consideration alone accounts for the
high demand for data provided in the English language. Moreover,
recent economic growth in the United States has encouraged fur6
ther capital investment in the information technology industry.12
The United States is also home to many of the world's major
software producers, including AT&T, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft,
120. Id. at para. 18.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., http://europa.eui.int. The official European Union website is
available in eleven different languages.
123. Equally significant is the numbers that underlie those percentages. In
1992, 1,489 of 2,213 multimedia databases were in English. By 1998 the number of
multimedia databases had risen to 28,199, of which 19,602 were in English. Id. at
31.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
126. Information Market Observatory, supra note 115, § 4.1.
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Motorola, IBM, GTE, Lucent Technologies and Oracle. As
software is important to the creation of databases, the platform on
which they are created is most often based on English
B.

The EU DatabaseDirective and Its Implementation

The EU Database Directive, promulgated on March 11, 1996,
mandated implementation by all states in the European Economic
Area by January 1, 1998.127 As we have seen, the EU Database
Directive both defines the scope of copyright protection for
databases and creates a new sui generis right. Consistent with Article 10 of TRIPS, the Directive specifies that copyright protection
extends to databases that by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation. 128 The exclusive rights granted to qualifying databases
largely parallel the exclusive rights granted under U.S. copyright
law. 129 The sui generis rights are vested in "a maker of a database
which shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment" in its creation, and allow the
maker to prevent the extraction and/or re-utilization of the contents in whole or in any substantial part (evaluated qualitatively
and/or quantitatively). 130 Although the initial term of the sui
generis right is fifteen years from the date of completion of a
database, the EU Directive mandates a new term of protection for
any database in which the original contents undergo substantial
change, and imposes no obligation to identify what data is new and
what has ostensibly fallen into the public domain.13 ' The effect of
this provision is to create a perpetually exclusive right for dynamic
127. EU Database Directive, supra note 4, at art. 16, § 1.
128. Id. at art. 3.
129. Id. at art. 5. The Directive provides:
The author of a database shall have the exclusive right to carry out or
authorize:
(1) temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any
form, in whole or in part
(2) translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration
(3) any form of distribution to the public of the database or copies
thereof
(4) any communication, display or performance to the public
(5) any reproduction, distribution, communication, display or performance to the public of the results of the acts referred to in (b).

Id.
130. Id. at art. 7, § 1.
131. Id. at art. 10, §§ 1, 2.
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databases. 132 Also troubling is that the EU Directive authorizes
but does not require member states to create fair use exceptions to
133
the general prohibition.
Two reasons have been given to explain why the EU adopted a
sui generis property right rather than a norm of unfair competition-(1) the logistical difficulty of harmonizing unfair competition
laws across the board and (2) a desire to protect databases from
"information Samaritans" as well as free riders.134 Some commentators have observed, however, that the creation of the sui generis
right mainly serves its intended purpose to "favor European
database publishers at the expense of their customers and non-EU
competitors." 135 Others have noted a discrepancy between the economic arguments justifying the protection of database contents
and the particular solution proposed in the Directive. 136 The main
reason given for a "copyright plus" approach to database protection
is to prevent the potential damage caused by the slavish copying by
competitors; the "economic case for the creation of a right to prevent extraction and reutilization of unoriginal content by users has
never been satisfactorily explained." 137 Even so, the compromise
reached in the Database Directive has satisfied neither database
makers nor users. 138 Whereas users would have preferred to see
compulsory licensing provisions incorporated into the Directive,
rather than simply held in reserve by the review clause of Article
16, database makers would have liked, among other things, to prevent the extraction and re-utilization of insubstantial amounts of
the contents of databases, if not by law, then by contract. 139
132. The danger of inadvertently creating perpetual protection for databases in
the United States was duly noted. See The Collections of Information Antipiracy
Act: Hearingson H.R. 354 Before the Subcomm. on Courtsand IntellectualProp.of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (Mar. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Pincus
Statement] (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, General Counsel, United States Department of Commerce), availableat http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-pinc.htm.
133. EU Database Directive, supra note 4, at art. 9; see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
134. See Michael J. Bastian, supra note 97, at 444; Mark Powell, The European
Union's DatabaseDirective: An InternationalAntidote of the Side Effects of Feist?,
20 Fordham Intl L.J. 1215, 1224-25 (1997); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note
85, at 81.
135. See von Simson, supra note 113, at 735.
136. Powell, supra note 134, at 1225.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1217.
139. Id.
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As of the end of 1998, only nine member states had passed
national legislation. 140 The Commission of the European Union
was forced to file complaints in the European Court of Justice
against several member states. 14 1 Today, with the exception of
Ireland, 14 2 all member states are now in compliance with the Directive. 43 However, the Directive has yielded disappointing results."' Harmonization of the originality standard for copyright
protection has not been achieved. Moreover, in some countries
compilations of data are now subjected to a triple standard of protection, as countries which previously granted a measure of protection to mere compilations of data have invoked their right under
Recital 52 of the Directive to retain exceptions traditionally specified by such rules."45 Copyright limitations applicable to
databases continue to vary from country to country, as do, albeit to
a lesser degree, the limitations on the sui generis right.
C.

Reciprocity

The European Database Directive contains a reciprocity provision that only accords protection to non-resident foreigners whose
home countries have enacted similar legislation. 146 While this pro140. Linn, supra note 96, at Table 1. The nine states were: Austria, Jan. 1,
1998; Belgium, Sept. 1, 1998; Denmark, July 1, 1998; Finland, Apr. 4, 1998;
France, June 16, 1998; Germany, Jan. 1, 1998; Spain, Apr. 1, 1998; Sweden, Jan.
1, 1998; United Kingdom, Jan. 1, 1998.
141. Countries with no implementation legislation as of January 1, 1999:
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Iceland, Norway
and Liechtenstein. See, e.g., Case C-484/99, Comm'n v. Hellenic Republic (1999)
2000 O.J. (C47/24); Case C-506/99, Comm'n v. Portuguese Republic (1999) 2000
O.J. (C79/13).
142. See ECJ C-370/199, Comm'n v. Ireland, 11 January 2001.
143. See F.W. Grosheide, DatabaseProtection-TheEuropean Way, 8 Wash. U.
J.L. & Pol'y (forthcoming) (2002).
144. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Implementing the European Database Directive, in
Intellectual Property and Information Law: Essays in Honour of Herman Cohen
Jehoramn 194 (Jan C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds., 1998).
145. EU Database Directive, supra note 4, at recital 52.
146. Id. at recital 56, which states:
[Tihe right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of a
database should apply to databases whose makers are nationals or habitual residents of third countries or to those produced by legal persons not
established in a Member State, within the meaning of the Treaty, only if
such third countries offer comparable protection to databases produced by
nationals of Member States or persons who have their habitual residence
in the territory of the Community.
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vision discriminates on the basis on nationality, the Directive was
carefully drafted to avoid conflict with the national (i.e., non-discriminatory) treatment provisions of both TRIPS and the Berne
Convention. 14 7 As the United States is now learning, allowing
countries with sufficient market power to force sui generis intellectual property provisions on other countries through reciprocity provisions creates a dangerous precedent. As recent experience
illustrates, industrialized nations can use reciprocity provisions to
influence the public policy choices of other countries. Further, developing countries lacking sufficient market power to impose legislation through reciprocity provisions will likely be further
disadvantaged relative to industrialized nations.
It has been argued elsewhere that the new, sui generis data
right (like the semiconductor chip design right that preceded it)
might fall within the meaning of "industrial property" as used in
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property;
thus, even if data rights fall outside the national treatment provisions of TRIPS and the Berne Convention, the sui generis data
right may be subject to the national treatment provisions of the
Paris Convention. 148 However, until this question is raised and resolved, either in World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement proceedings or elsewhere, the United States must make a
unilateral determination as to what is in its national interest.
IV.

UNITED STATES LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS

A. History of Database Protectionin the United States
Within ten weeks of the promulgation of the EU Database Directive, the first legislation aimed at creating a sui generis right in
the United States, H.R. 3531, was proposed in the House of Representatives. 14 9 H.R. 3531 would have created a very strong property right with a twenty-five year term and potentially severe
147. Debra B. Rosier, The European Union's Proposed Directive for the Legal
Protection of Databases:A New Threat to the Free Flow of Information, 10 High
Tech. L.J. 105, 137 (1995).
148. See McManis, Taking TRIPS, supra note 16, at 258-59; Paul E. Geller,
Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 Int'l. Law. 99, 112 (1995).
149. Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996,
H.R. 3531 §§ 6, 9, 104th Cong. (1996).
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criminal sanctions for infringement. 15 0 Opposition was unexpectedly intense and the bill never reached the floor. H.R. 3531's sequel, H.R. 2652, responded to concerns from the research and
library communities by including limited fair use provisions. 15 1
This bill was passed by the House as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act on August 4, 1998; however, it was subsequently stricken during negotiations with the Senate, and the
DMCA passed shortly thereafter on October 28, 1998.152
The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, as introduced on January 19, 1999, would accord a database developer a
broad right in factual compilations, subject not only to a specific
limitation for certain non-profit educational, scientific and research uses, but also to a broader limitation for "reasonable uses"
generally. 153 The reasonableness of a particular use is to be evaluated by a multi-factor test that is somewhat reminiscent of the fair
use privilege contained in section 107 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976.154 Notwithstanding the inclusion of this broadened fair use provision, opponents of H.R. 354 introduced an
alternative bill on May 19, 1999, the Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, that based liability on a theory
more analogous to the common law tort of "hot news"
misappropriation.1

B.

55

Comparison of H.R. 354, H.R. 1858 and the EU Database
Directive

1.

Theories and Scope of Protection

As we have seen, H.R. 354 creates a sui generis right in the
contents of a database, somewhat analogous to that mandated by
the EU Database Directive, thus recreating a limited form of the
"sweat of the brow" protection laid to rest in Feist.156 By contrast,
H.R. 1858 protects databases by creating liability for misappropri150. See id.
151. Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998).
152. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1998).
153. H.R. 354 § 1403, 106th Cong. (1999).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
155. H.R. 1858 § 103, 106th Cong. (1999).
156. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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ation, thereby "re-federalizing" the United States Supreme Court's
15 7
holding in InternationalNews, at least as applied to databases.
H.R. 354 prohibits the extraction or making available to others
all or a substantial part of a collection of information gathered, organized or maintained by another person through the investment
of substantial resources, that causes material harm to the primary
or a related market of that other person or of a successor in interest. 158 The key to understanding the scope of this property right,
and how it differs from a right based on a theory of unfair competition, is in the definitions of "primary" and "related" markets.
A primary market is any market in which a product or service
that incorporates a collection of information is offered and in which
a person claiming protection with respect to that collection of information derives or reasonably expects to derive revenue-directly
or indirectly. 5 9 In other words, a primary market is an existing
market in which the person claiming protection already earns or
reasonably expects to derive revenue. A related market, by contrast, includes each of the following (1) any market in which a person claiming protection with respect to a collection of information
has "taken demonstrable steps" to offer in commerce within a short
period of time a product or service incorporating that collection of
information with the reasonable expectation to derive revenue, directly or indirectly (i.e., a "zone of probable expansion," to borrow a
phrase from trademark law) and (2) any market in which products
or services that incorporate collections of information similar to a
product or service offered by the person claiming protection are offered and in which persons offering such similar products or services derive or reasonably expect to derive revenue, directly or
indirectly (i.e., virtually any potential market in which a compilation of information or substantial portion thereof might reasonably
60
be expected to earn revenue).1
The original language of the bill would have extended its protection to any "actual or potential market" of a database, and defined a "potential market" as any market in which a claimant for
protection "has current and demonstrable plans to exploit or that
is commonly exploited by persons offering similar products or ser157. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
158. H.R. 354 § 1402, 106th Cong. (1999).
159. Id. §§ 1401(3)-(4), 1402.
160. Id. § 1401(4).

38

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:7

vices incorporating collections of information." 16 1 The Clinton Administration was sufficiently concerned over the breadth of this
proposed language that in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property the General Counsel of the
United States Department of Commerce, Andrew J. Pincus, suggested that the Subcommittee reexamine the concepts of "actual"
and "potential" markets. 162 Yet, apart from substituting the word
"related" for the word "potential," the final bill seems not to have
responded to the Administration's concerns.
As we have seen, the EU Database Directive limits the permissible exceptions to the sui generis right in electronic databases to
extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific
research, and only so long as the source is indicated and to the
16 3
extent justified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved.
By contrast, H.R. 354 not only contains a specific privilege for certain non-profit educational, scientific and research uses16 4 (as well
as a variety of other specific privileges' 6 5), but also contains a
much broader "reasonable use" privilege, 16 which is reminiscent
of the fair use privilege contained in section 107 of the United
States Copyright Act. While this "reasonable use" provision was
apparently considered a necessary concession to domestic critics of
earlier versions of the bill, the resulting difference in the scope of
permissible uses under H.R. 354 and the EU Database Directive
raises the question whether H.R. 354 would in fact provide protection "comparable" to the sui generis right mandated in the EU
Directive.
The question of comparability becomes still murkier when the
terms of protection under H.R. 354 and the EU Database Directive
are compared. While both provide for a fifteen year term of protection that is subject to extension in order to protect cumulatively
substantial updating of the database, the EU Database Directive
161. See H.R. 354 §§ 1401(3), 1402, 106th Cong. (Jan. 19, 1999) (as originally
introduced in the House of Representatives).
162. See Pincus Statement, supra note 132, at 5.
163. EU Database Directive, supra note 4, at art. 9(b).
164. H.R. 354 § 1403(b), 106th Cong. (1999).
165. Id. § 1403(c)(i) (allowing individual items and other insubstantial parts,
independently gathered information, verification purposes, news reporting, transfer of copy, genealogical information, and investigative, protective, or intelligence
activities).
166. Id. § 1403(a).
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apparently mandates a dynamic approach that would protect a
new edition in its entirety, whereas H.R. 354 adopts a variable
term of protection that would only protect the new material in the
16 7
new edition.
Article 10 of the EU Database Directive states that any substantial change to the contents of a database that causes the
database to be considered a substantial new investment qualifies
"the database resulting from that investment"-and not simply the
new material-to its own term of protection. The database producer is apparently under no obligation to distinguish what data in
that database is new and what has been previously protected.
By contrast, H.R. 354 states (1) that no action may "be maintained for making available or extracting all or a substantial part
of a collection of information that occurs more than 15 years after
the portion of the collection that is made available or extracted was
first offered in commerce following the investment of resources
that qualifies that portion of the collection for protection," 168 and
(2) that "the person claiming protection bears the burden of proving "that the date on which the portion of the collection that was
made available or extracted was first offered ... in commerce...
was no more than fifteen years prior to the time when it was made
available or extracted by the defendant." 16 9 H.R. 354 also states
that "[nIo monetary relief shall be available ... [if the defendant]
could not reasonably determine whether the date on which the portion of the collection that was made available or extracted was first
offered in commerce" was more than 15 years prior to the violation. 170 Where "a collection of information into which all or a substantial part of a government collection of information is
incorporated.... no monetary relief shall be available for a violation ... unless a statement appear[s] ... in a manner and location
so as to give reasonable notice, identifying the government collec17 1
tion and the government entity from which it was obtained."
In short, whereas the EU Database Directive appears to mandate dynamic (i.e., continuing) protection for an entire database
that is the subject of cumulatively substantial updating, H.R. 354
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. § 1409(c).
Id.
Id. § 1409(d).
H.R. 354 § 1408(a), 106th Cong. (1999).
Id. § 1408(b).
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would protect only those substantial portions of a database that
can be shown to have been offered in commerce within the last fifteen years, and would deny monetary relief where the defendant
could not reasonably distinguish old and new data, or in the case of
collections incorporating information collected by the government,
was not given reasonable notification of the government source.
Here, too, the difference in the scope of protection mandated by the
EU Directive and that provided for under H.R. 354 raises the question whether the European Council would consider the two to be
comparable.
2. H.R. 1858
In contrast to both H.R. 354 and the EU Database Directive,
H.R. 1858 is a much more narrowly tailored bill, which would (1)
prevent wholesale competitive duplication of databases and (2)
prohibit misappropriation of real-time market information. 172 Title I of H.R. 1858 would make it a violation to sell or distribute to
the public a database that is a duplicate of another database, when
the duplicate is sold or distributed in competition with the original
database. 173 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is vested with
specific jurisdiction, under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 174 to prevent violations of the proposed act,' 7 5 but the bill
does not expressly create a private right of action to enforce violations of section 102.
This limited enforcement mechanism is H.R. 1858's most controversial feature. While the Federal Trade Commission claims to
176
have experience in formulating policy and remedies in this field
172. H.R. 1858 §§ 102, 201, 106th Cong. (1999).
173. Id. § 102(1), (2).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1997).
175. Id. § 107(c). A recent FTC consent agreement and order suggests that the
FTC may already have jurisdiction under section 5 to prevent this form of unfair
competition. See Stipulated Consent Agreement and Final Order, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc. (DDC 2000) (stating that under the threat of FTC action,
ReverseAuction entered into a consent decree for violating eBay's "user agreement," because ReverseAuction, an upstart competitor in the online auction market, copied eBay's customer database in order to solicit new customers), at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reverseconsent.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2001).
176. See Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999: Hearingon
H.R. 1858 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999) (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission) [hereinafter FTC Prepared Statement], availableat httpJ/
www.ftc.gov/opp/hr09881.htm. In their prepared statement the FTC cites the
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and has agreed that the threat of private actions could be used by
market incumbents to threaten potential entrants, thus potentially raising difficult issues for courts called on to interpret the
misuse defense contained in section 106(b) of the bill, 17 7 the FTC
itself has expressed concern about the enforcement feature of the
bill, particularly if the FTC is the sole statutory enforcer. 1 78 Apparently, the drafters of H.R. 1858 do not wish to encourage private lawsuits, and believe that market incumbents, particularly
sole-source providers, will think twice before complaining about
data piracy to one of the country's two federal antitrust enforcement agencies.
Although Title I would be enforceable only through the FTC
proceedings, the theory of liability is akin to the common law tort
of misappropriation of "hot news."17 9 Value-added and transformative uses are permitted, as H.R. 1858 considers a copy to be an
infringement only if it is "substantially the same" as the original,' 8 0 and prohibits the public sale or distribution of a duplicate
database only where it is distributed in competition with the original database.18 '
Title II of H.R. 1858 would create a separate prohibition
against the "misappropriation" of real-time market information.
Section 201 states that any person who "obtains directly or indirectly from a market information processor real-time market information," and "directly or indirectly sells, distributes, redistributes,
Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition, and three of its recent decisions, In re Softsearch Holdings, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,171 (F.T.C.
July 28, 1997 (consent decree); In re Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) $124,006 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 1996) (consent decree); In re Provident Cos.,
Inc., No. 991-0101, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,991 (F.T.C. May 24, 1999) (proposed consent
decree, subject to public comment), in which the FTC considered the potentially
anticompetitive effects of the increased market power that can result from consolidation among database owners and vendors. Id.
177. FTC Prepared Statement, supra note 176, at 10; see also infra notes 18889 and accompanying text.
178. Id. In a footnote, the FTC states its understanding that state common law
misappropriation suits involving databases will generally be preempted under section 105(b) of the proposed act. Id. at 10 n.68. However, section 105(b) merely
states that "no State law that prohibits or that otherwise regulates conduct that is
subject to the prohibitions specified in section 102 shall be effective to the extent
that such State law is inconsistent with section 102." H.R. 1858 § 105(b), 106th
Cong. (1999) (emphasis added).
179. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
180. H.R. 1858 §§ 101(2), 102.
181. Id. § 102.
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or otherwise disseminates such information without the authorization of such market information processor, shall be liable to that
market information processor . ... "182 In contrast to Title I, the
prohibition of Title II is not limited to the wholesale duplications of
real-time market information, nor to the sale or distribution of the
information in competition with the information processor. Moreover, this prohibition would be privately enforceable through a civil
83
action for monetary and injunctive relief.'
While the protection that H.R. 1858 would provide could
hardly be called comparable to that specified in H.R. 354 or mandated by the EU Database Directive, this is not to suggest that
enactment of H.R. 1858, rather than H.R. 354, would leave U.S.
database producers wholly unprotected in Europe. To the contrary, U.S. database producers would arguably be entitled to precisely the same protection in Europe that they would be (and in
fact currently are) entitled to in the United States. This is so because Article lObis of the Paris Convention states that member
countries of the Paris Union are bound to assure nationals of such
countries effective protection against unfair competition, and goes
on to state that any act of competition contrary to honest practices
in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair
competition.' 8 4 Given that the EU has now mandated sui generis
protection for database contents even against non-competitive extractions and re-utilizations, European countries can hardly argue
that wholesale duplication of database contents in order to compete with the database producer is not an act of unfair competition
within the meaning of Article lObis of the Paris Convention.
Thus, the argument that enactment of sui generis protection of
the sort spelled out in H.R. 354 is necessary (or sufficient) for U.S.
database producers to obtain protection for their databases in the
EU is suspect. As we have also seen, it is not clear that passage of
H.R. 354 will be deemed sufficiently comparable to qualify U.S.
database producers for the (arguably over-broad) sui generis protection now available in Europe. Indeed, one feature that H.R. 354
182. Id. § 201 (proposing to amend § 11A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1904).
183. Id.
184. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303, art. lObis.
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and H.R. 1858 have in common distinguishes both bills from the
type of protection mandated by the EU Directive, and further undermines the argument that either bill would provide comparable
protection. This feature concerns the enforceability of contracts
that put additional restrictions on the use of database contents.
3.

ContractualCircumvention

While the two U.S. bills provide two different approaches to
the protection of database contents, both bills make it clear that
nothing in the legislation would preempt contracts that place additional restrictions on the use of a database. H.R. 354 is particularly adamant in this regard. Section 1405(a) of H.R. 354 states
that nothing in this bill "shall affect rights... or obligations relating to information, including . . . the law of contract." 18 5 While
section 1405(b) would preempt state law with respect to rights that
are equivalent to those protected under the new act, that same section makes it clear that the law of contracts "shall not be deemed to
provide equivalent rights for purposes of this subsection." 18 6 Additionally, section 1405(e) reiterates that nothing in the proposed act
"shall restrict the rights of parties... to enter into licenses or any
other contracts with respect to making available or extracting col18 7
lections of information."
Section 105(c) of H.R. 1858 contains a nearly identical provision, stating that nothing in the act "shall restrict the rights of parties freely to enter into licenses or any other contracts with respect
to the use of information." However, this provision is made subject
to section 106(b) of the bill, which states that a person shall not be
liable for a violation of the act if the person benefiting from the
protection afforded a database under the act "misuses" the protection.18 In determining whether a person has misused the protection, a court is to consider, among other factors (1) the extent to
which the ability of persons to engage in the permitted acts under
this title has been frustrated by contractual arrangements or technological measures and (2) the extent to which information contained in a database that is the sole source of the information
contained therein is made available through licensing or sale on
185.
186.
187.
188.

H.R.
Id. §
Id. §
H.R.

354 § 1405(a), 106th Cong. (1999).
1405(b).
1405(e).
1858 §§ 105(c), 106(b), 106th Cong. (1999).
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reasonable terms and conditions. 189 While this provision may not
be precisely "comparable" to the EU Directive's absolute nullification of contract provisions contrary to the rights of lawful users of
databases, it certainly comes closer to the public policy served by
that prohibition than does section 1405 of H.R. 354. The upshot is
that H.R. 354 may be disqualified as "comparable" to the protection specified by the EU Directive precisely because it gives
database producers too much contractual freedom to vary the
terms of the statutory protection.
CONCLUSION

In the short time since the Supreme Court decided Feist, electronic databases have become an integral part of many industries.
As electronic databases are navigated more efficiently than printed
publications, ensuring incentives for the creation of future
databases is of growing importance to a sound industrial policy.
Recent technological developments have eroded the natural leadtime that database developers have heretofore enjoyed.
As we have seen, two distinct legislative responses to Feist can
be found in H.R. 354 and H.R. 1858. Whereas H.R. 354 would accord a database producer rights that are analogous (but not necessarily "comparable") to those mandated by the EU Database
Directive, thus recreating a limited form of the "sweat of the brow"
protection that Feist laid to rest, H.R. 1858 would in effect "re-federalize" the holding of InternationalNews, at least as it applies to
databases in interstate and foreign commerce, and provide protection against two specific types of data piracy.
The general approach (though not necessarily the enforcement
mechanism) of H.R. 1858 is superior to H.R. 354 because it prohibits wholesale competitive duplication of databases, while ensuring
access to and transformative uses of factual compilations. H.R.
354, by contrast, would extend protection beyond a database producer's primary market to related markets, and would define related markets sufficiently broadly that a database producer could
control a wide range of non-competitive uses of data and reserve
those potential markets for itself.
Reincarnations of H.R. 1858 and H.R. 354 are likely to surface
during the present congressional session. The passage of either
189. Id. § 106(b)(1)-(2).
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bill will have a significant impact on intellectual property laws and
policies in both the United States and worldwide. If the United
States is perceived to be following the European Union's lead, by
according a comparable sui generis right to database developers,
then one would expect similar systems to be implemented
worldwide.
However, there is no domestic policy justification for the
United States to follow the EU's lead. The economic case for creating a sui generis right to prevent extraction and reutilization of
unoriginal database contents has never been satisfactorily explained by the EU itself. The EU Database Directive frankly
seems designed to favor European database producers at the expense of their customers and non-EU competitors, and to pressure
the rest of the world to create comparable protection. The Directive will inevitably drive up the price of databases produced in Europe. If the United States resists the temptation to adopt
overbroad database legislation, the U.S. database industry should
become all the more competitive in the global market place. Nor
will U.S. database producers be all that disadvantaged in Europe
itself, as European countries are obliged under Article l0bis of the
Paris Convention to provide protection against unfair competition,
which would arguably include protecting against the wholesale
competitive duplication of databases created by others. Those U.S.
database producers who believe that the new sui generis protection
is crucial for their operations in Europe can qualify for protection
by opening a registered office in the EU that is genuinely linked on
an ongoing basis with the economy of an EU member state.
If, on the other hand, the United States gives in to the temptation to adopt overbroad database protection, then U.S. database
users (and, in short order, database users worldwide) will have
been unwittingly enlisted to subsidize a European effort to gain
market share in an industry that the United States currently
dominates.

